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Abstract
We modify the concept of quantum strategic game to make it useful for exten-
sive form games. We prove that our modification allows to consider the normal
representation of any finite extensive game using the fundamental concepts of
quantum information. The Selten’s Horse game and the general form of two-stage
extensive game with perfect information are studied to illustrate a potential appli-
cation of our idea. In both examples we use Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein approach
as well as Marinatto-Weber approach to quantization of games.
Keywords Extensive game · Normal representation · Quantum game · Nash
equilibrium
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1 Introduction
Over the period of twelve years of research on quantum games [1], the idea of quantum
strategic 2 × 2 game [2] has been well established. From mathematical point of view,
the quantum information approach to a 2× 2 game is described by the four-tuple:
(H , |ψin〉, {Ui}, {Ei}) . (1)
The Hilbert space H = C2 ⊗ C2 is the place of the game and the sets of unitary
operators U1,U2 ⊆ SU(2) play the role of strategy sets for the first and the second
player, respectively. Given a unit vector |ψin〉 ∈ H (the initial state), the players each
choose a unitary operator Ui ∈ Ui changing the vector |ψin〉 ∈ H into the vector |ψfin〉 :=
(U1 ⊗ U2) |ψin〉 (the final state). The last components are the functionals Ei : H → R for
i = 1, 2. They imitate payoff functions for the players assigning a real number to the final
state |ψfin〉. It turns out that the four tuple (1) generalizes playing a classical 2×2 game.
The two well-known ways based on the framework (1): the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein
(EWL) scheme [3] and the Marinatto-Weber (MW) scheme [4] show that a 2×2 game can
be successfully written in the form (1): it is possible to set each of the four components,
so that a 2 × 2 game and the corresponding game defined by the four-tuple (1) are the
same with respect to a game-theoretic analysis. Another key feature is that the protocol
(1) allows to achieve results unavailable in the game played classically (see, for example,
[5] and [6]). In our paper we are going to deal with extensive games in quantum domain.
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In spite of quite many researches connected with this issue (for instance, concerning
quantum Stackelberg duopoly [7] and [8]), there is no generally accepted framework for
playing quantum extensive games by now. Interestingly, we have shown in [9] that (1)
may indeed be useful for extensive games with imperfect information. In this paper, we
extend our previous idea. We prove that the slight modification of (H , |ψin〉, {Ui}, {Ei})
allows to obtain normal representation of extensive games in the quantum domain.
2 Preliminaries to game theory
Definitions in the preliminaries are based on [10]. This section starts with a definition
of a finite extensive game (without chance moves).
Definition 2.1 Let the following components be given:
• A finite set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of players.
• A finite set H of finite sequences that satisfies the following two properties:
– the empty sequence ∅ is a member of H;
– if (ak)k=1,2,...,K ∈ H and L < K then (ak)k=1,2,...,L ∈ H.
Each member of H is a history and each component of a history is an action taken
by a player. A history (a1, a2, . . . , aK) ∈ H is terminal if there is no aK+1 such
that (a1, a2, . . . , aK , aK+1) ∈ H. The set of actions available after the nonterminal
history h is denoted A(h) = {a : (h, a) ∈ H} and the set of terminal histories is
denoted Z.
• The player function P : H \ Z → N that points to a player who takes an action
after the history h.
• For each player i ∈ N a partition Ii of {h ∈ H\Z : P (h) = i} with the property that
for each Ii ∈ Ii and for each h, h′ ∈ Ii an equality A(h) = A(h′) is fulfilled. Every
information set Ii of the partition corresponds to the state of player’s knowledge.
When the player makes move after certain history h belonging to Ii, she knows
that the course of events of the game takes the form of one of histories being part
of this information set. She does not know, however, if it is the history h or the
other history from Ii.
• For each player i ∈ N a utility function ui : Z → R which assigns a number
(payoff) to each of the terminal histories.
A five-tuple (N,H, P, {Ii}, {ui}) is called a finite extensive game.
Our deliberations focus on games with perfect recall (although Def. 2.1 defines extensive
games with imperfect recall as well) - this means games in which at each stage every
player remembers all the information about a course of the game that she knew earlier
(see [10] and [11] to learn about formal description of this feature).
The notions: action and strategy mean the same in static games, because players
choose their actions once and simultaneously. In the majority of extensive games a player
can make her decision about an action depending on all the actions taken previously by
herself and also by all the other players. In other words, players can make some plans of
actions at their disposal such that these plans point out to a specific action depending
on the course of a game. Such a plan is defined as a strategy in an extensive game.
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Definition 2.2 A pure strategy si of a player i in a game (N,H, P, {Ii}, {ui}) is a func-
tion that assigns an action in A(Ii) to each information set Ii ∈ Ii.
Like in the theory of strategic games, a mixed strategy ti of a player i in an extensive game
is a probability distribution over the set of player i’s pure strategies. Therefore, pure
strategies are of course special cases of mixed strategies and from this place whenever we
shall write strategy without specifying that it is either pure or mixed, this term will cover
both cases. Let us define an outcome O(s) of a pure strategy profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn)
in an extensive game without chance moves to be a terminal history that results if each
player i ∈ N follows the plan of si. More formally, O(s) is the history (a1, a2, . . . , aK) ∈ Z
such that for 0 ≤ k < K we have sP (a1,a2,...,ak)(a1, a2, . . . , ak) = ak+1.
Definition 2.3 Let an extensive game Γ = (N,H, P, {Ii}, {ui}) be given. The normal
representation of Γ is a strategic game (N, {Si}, {u′i}) in which for each player i ∈ N :
• Si is the set of pure strategies of a player i in Γ;
• u′i :
∏
i∈N Si → R defined as u′i(s) := ui(O(s)) for every s ∈
∏
i∈N Si and i ∈ N .
One of the most important notions in game theory is a notion of an equilibrium intro-
duced by John Nash in [12]. A Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies where the
strategy of each player is optimal if the choice of its opponents is fixed. In other words,
in the equilibrium none of the players has any reason to unilaterally deviate from an
equilibrium strategy. A precise formulation is as follows:
Definition 2.4 Let (N, {Si}, {ui}) be a game in strategic form. A profile of strategies
(t∗1, t
∗
2, . . . , t
∗
n) is a Nash equilibrium if for each player i ∈ N and for all si ∈ Si:
ui(t
∗
i , t
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, t∗−i) where t∗−i = (t∗1, . . . , t∗i−1, t∗i+1, . . . , t∗n). (2)
A Nash equilibrium in an extensive game with perfect recall is a Nash equilibrium of its
normal representation, hence Def. 2.4 applies to strategic games as well as to extensive
ones.
3 Preliminaries to quantum computing
In this section we give a brief overview of the Dirac notation and basic terms of quantum
information. The preliminaries are based on [13] and are sufficient to study the paper.
Nonetheless, we encourage the reader unfamiliar with techniques from theory of quantum
information to consult [13] and, for example, [14].
First of all we adopt the convention that instead of denoting vectors by boldface
letters, e.g. v, they are denoted as kets: |v〉.
Let Cm+1 be a vector space with the fixed basis {|v0〉, |v1〉, . . . , |vm〉} and let
|φ〉 = a0|v0〉+ a1|v1〉+ · · ·+ am|vm〉, where aj ∈ C. (3)
The vector |φ〉 can be also written in the column matrix notation
|φ〉 = ( a0 a1 · · · am )T (4)
Let Cm+1 be now regarded as a Hilbert space and |φ〉, |χ〉 ∈ Cm+1. The inner product
of the vector |φ〉 with the vector |χ〉 will be denoted by 〈φ|χ〉. The notation 〈φ| is used
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for the dual vector to |φ〉. The dual vector 〈φ| (also called bra) is a linear operator
〈φ| : Cm+1 → C defined by 〈φ|(|χ〉) := 〈φ|χ〉. Thus, the inner product requirements
imply that
〈φ| = a∗0〈v1|+ a∗1〈v2|+ · · ·+ a∗m〈vm|. (5)
The common assumption in quantum computing is to consider Hilbert space Cm+1 with
an orthonormal basis. Let us denote the basis as {|x〉}x=0,1,...,m (also called computational
basis). Let |φ〉 = ∑x bx|x〉 and |χ〉 = ∑x cy|x〉 be the vectors with respect to the
basis {|x〉}x=0,1,...,m. Then the inner product 〈φ|χ〉 can be expressed in terms of matrix
multiplication:
〈φ|χ〉 = ( b∗0 b∗1 · · · b∗m ) ( c0 c1 · · · cm )T . (6)
In this case, the dual vector 〈φ| has a row matrix representation whose entries are
complex conjugates of the corresponding entries of the column matrix representation of
|φ〉.
The fundamental concept of quantum information is quantum bit (qubit) described
mathematically as a unit vector |ϕ〉 in a Hilbert space C2. According to the notation
explained above:
|ϕ〉 = d0|0〉+ d1|1〉, where d0, d1 ∈ C and |d0|2 + |d1|2 = 1. (7)
The measurement of a qubit with respect to an orthonormal basis {|w0〉, |w1〉} (not nec-
essarily in the computational basis) yields the result w0 or w1 with probability |〈wj|ϕ〉|2
leaving the qubit in the corresponding state |w0〉 or |w1〉. In particular, measuring the
qubit given by (7) with respect to {|0〉, |1〉} results in the outcome 0 with probability
|d0|2 and the outcome 1 with probability |d1|2, with post-measurement states |0〉 and
|1〉, respectively.
Suppose H1 and H2 are Hilbert spaces with orthonormal bases {|x〉}x=0,1,...,m1 and
{|y〉}y=0,1,...,m2, respectively. Then the tensor product H1 ⊗ H2 is a Hilbert space of
(m1 + 1)(m2 + 1) dimensionality with the orthonormal basis {|x〉 ⊗ |y〉}. The matrix
representation of an element |x〉 ⊗ |y〉 is the Kronecker product of respective matrix
representations of |x〉 and |y〉. In the further part of the paper we use the abbreviated
notation |x〉|y〉 or |x, y〉 for the tensor product |x〉 ⊗ |y〉.
A system of n qubits |ϕi〉 is described as a unit vector |ψ〉 in the tensor product
space
⊗n
j=1C
2 that has 2n-element computational basis
{|x1〉 ⊗ |x2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉}xj=0,1. (8)
Thus, it is described by the vector
|ψ〉 =
∑
x1,x2,...,xn
dx1,x2,...,xn|x1, x2, . . . , xn〉,
where dx1,x2,...,xn ∈ C and
∑
x1,x2,...,xn
|dx1,x2,...,xn|2 = 1.
(9)
We say that the state (9) is separable if it can be written as |ψ〉 =⊗ni=1 |ϕi〉 for some
|ϕi〉 ∈ C2, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The dual vector 〈ψ| is defined in the same way as in (5).
Similarly, the measurement of the state given by (9) with respect to an orthonormal
basis {|wj〉}2nj=1 yields the result wj with probability |〈wj|ψ〉|2. Otherwise, the state |ψ〉
is called entangled.
We use the Dirac notation throughout the whole paper. However, each of the results
below can be easily reconstructed using the matrix notation.
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4 Normal representation of extensive games in quan-
tum domain
From that moment on, we will consider extensive games with two available actions at
each information set so that we could use only qubits for convienience. Any game richer
in actions can be transferred to quantum domain by using quantum objects of higher
dimensionality.
Let us extend the protocol (1) to include components making it useful for extensive
games. Such a quantum game is specified by a six-tuple:
ΓQI = (H , N, |ψin〉, ξ, {Uj}, {Ei}) (10)
where the components are defined as follows:
• H is a complex Hilbert space⊗mj=1C2 with an orthonormal basis B.
• N is a set of players with the property that |N | ≤ m.
• |ψin〉 is the initial state of a quantum system of m qubits |ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉, . . . , |ϕm〉.
• ξ : {1, 2, . . . , m} → N is a surjective mapping. A value ξ(j) indicates a player who
carries out a unitary operation on a qubit |ϕj〉.
• For each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} the set Uj is a subset of unitary operators from SU(2)
that are available for a qubit j. A (pure) strategy of a player i is a map τi that
assigns a unitary operation Uj ∈ Uj to a qubit |ϕj〉 for every j ∈ ξ−1(i). The final
state |ψfin〉 when the players have performed their strategies on corresponding
qubits is defined as:
|ψfin〉 := (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn)|ψin〉 =
⊗
i∈N
⊗
j∈ξ−1(i)
Uj |ψin〉. (11)
• For each i ∈ N the map Ei is a utility (payoff) functional that specifies a utility
for the player i. The functional Ei is defined by the formula:
Ei =
∑
|b〉∈B
vi(b)|〈b|ψfin〉|2, where vi(b) ∈ R. (12)
There are only two additional components in (10): N and ξ, in comparison with (1).
They completely specify qubits to which a player is permitted to apply her unitary
operator. Notice also that the protocol of quantization of strategic games according to
[2] is obtained from (H , N, |ψin〉, ξ, {Uj}, {Ei}) by putting |N | = m = 2. We claim
that such addition together with appropriate fixed values vi(b) in (12) are sufficient for
considering an extensive game in quantum domain (of course, if the assumption that
the tuple (H , |ψin〉, {Ui}, {Ei}) correctly describes strategic games in quantum domain
is true). The line of thought is as follows. Any strategic game can be considered as
a special case of an extensive game where players move sequentially but each of them
does not have any knowledge about actions taken by the other players. In other words,
each player in a strategic game has exactly one information set in which she takes an
action. Thus, in a simple case of 2× 2 bimatrix game, the scheme (1), in fact, identifies
an operation on a qubit with player’s move made at her unique information set, and
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then the individual game outcomes are assigned to appropriate measurement results.
An extensive game can have many information sets, and more than one of them can be
assigned to the same player. Therefore, our extension of (H , |ψin〉, {Ui}, {Ei}) is aimed
at similar identification for extensive games. As a result, we obtain that we are able to
write in (10) the normal representation of an extensive game.
Before we formulate the formal statement, notice first that the tuple (10), in fact,
determines some game in strategic form in the sense of classical game theory. If H
and |ψin〉 are fixed, each player i ∈ N chooses her strategy from a set
⊗
j∈ξ−1(i) Uj
and then the associated utility Ei is determined. Therefore, it always makes sense to
associate (10) with some (N, {Si}, {ui}). Secondly, let us specify a sufficient condition of
equivalence for two strategic games (N, {Si}, {ui}) and (N, {S ′i}, {u′i}). Namely, if there
is a bijective mapping gi : Si → S ′i for each i ∈ N such that for each profile s ∈
∏
i∈N Si
we have u(s) = u′(g(s)) where g =
∏
i∈N gi, then the games are isomorphic (to find
out more about isomorphisms of strategic games see [15]). Now, we can formulate the
following proposition:
Proposition 4.1 Let Γ = (N,H, P, {Ii}, {ui}) be a finite extensive game with two avail-
able actions at each information set. Then there exists a six-tuple (10) that specifies a
game isomorphic to the normal representation of Γ.
Proof. Let us consider an n-player extensive game Γ with m information sets. In
addition, let us assume two-element set of available actions A(Ii) in each information
set Ii. We specify components of the tuple Γ
QI as follows. Let B be the computational
basis of
⊗m
j=1C
2 and let the initial state |ψin〉 be of the form |b〉, where |b〉 is some fixed
state of B. Let us restrict the set of available operators on C2 to the set of two operators
{σ0, σ1} where σ0 is the identity operator and σ1 is the bit-flip Pauli operator. This
specification implies that for any mapping ξ : {1, 2, . . . , m} → N specified in (10) each
strategy profile is an operator of the form
⊗m
j=1 σ
j, where σj ∈ {σ0, σ1}. Thus, for each
strategy profile τ there is some |b′〉 ∈ B such that
|ψfin〉 =
m⊗
j=1
σj |ψin〉 = |b′〉〈b′| and Ei(τ) = vi(b′) for i ∈ N. (13)
Let us fix a bijective mapping ζ between {1, 2, . . . , m} and the set {Ii} of all players’
information sets of Γ. Since for each player i and history h ∈ Ii we have P (h) = i we can
simply take P (Ii) = i. Then the correspondence ξ := P ◦ ζ associates each information
set of each player with exactly one qubit. As |A(Ii)| = |{σ0, σ1}| = 2 and a number of
information sets of Γ is equal to a number of qubits, a set of strategies Si of the normal
representation of Γ and a strategy set Ti of quantum game defined by the tuple (10)
are equinumerous (with cardinality equal 2|ξ
−1(i)| each) for each i ∈ N . Therefore, for
each i ∈ N , we can define a bijective mapping gi : Si → Ti. These mappings induce the
following bijection between the sets of strategy profiles:
g = (gi)i∈N :
∏
i∈N
Si →
∏
i∈N
Ti. (14)
The equations in (13) imply that for all i we can select numbers vi(b) ∈ ui(Z) in (12) in
a way that ui(s) = Ei(g(s)) where ui is the utility function of the normal representation
of Γ. Such specification of (10) makes it isomorphic to the normal representation of Γ. 
Many researches on quantum games played via scheme (1) are based on appropriately
fixed basis for a space, the initial state, and a range of available unitary operators, in
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Figure 1: The modified Selten’s Horse game specified by Γ1 a) and its normal represen-
tation b) where the players choose between rows, column and matrices, respectively.
order to obtain interesting properties of a quantum game. We will use the two best-
known configurations of (H , |ψin〉, {Ui}, {Ei}): the Marinatto-Weber (MW) scheme [4]
and the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL) scheme [3] to examine extensive games via
the protocol (10) (see also [6] and [9] for other applications of these schemes). In the
former scheme players are allowed to use only the identity operator and the bit-flip
Pauli operator. The results superior to classical results are obtained by manipulating
the initial state |ψin〉. The later scheme allows to use broader range of unitary operators
(including also the whole set SU(2)). The following examples concern both settings.
To convert the following games into quantum ones, we use the same reasoning as
in the proof of Proposition 4.1. The first example deals with a case where each player
operates on one qubit.
Example 4.2 Let us consider a three player extensive game:
Γ1 =
({1, 2, 3}, H, P, {Ii}i∈{1,2,3}, {ui}i∈{1,2,3}) (15)
determined by the following components:
• H = {∅, (a0), (a1), (a0, c0), (a0, c1), (a1, b0), (a1, b1), (a1, b0, c0), (a1, b0, c1)};
• P (∅) = 1, P (a1) = 2, P (a0) = P (a1, b0) = 3;
• I1 = {∅}, I2 = {(a1)}, I3 = {(a0), (a1, b0)};
• u1,2(a0, c0) = 3, u1,2(a0, c1) = u1,2(a1, b0, c1) = 0,
u1,2(a1, b1) = 2, u1,2(a1, b0, c0) = 5,
u3(a0, c0) = u3(a1, b0, c1) = 1, u3(a0, c1) = u3(a1, b0, c0) = 0, u3(a1, b1) = 2.
The game is depicted in Fig. 1. It is the Selten’s Horse game [16] with modified payoffs.
Since each of the players has one information set, their sets of strategies are {a0, a1},
{b0, b1}, and {c0, c1}, respectively. Profiles: (a0, b1, c0) and (a1, b1, c1) are the only pure
Nash equilibria in this game and indeed each of them could be equally likely chosen
as a scenario of the game. The utilities for players 1 and 2 assigned to (a0, b1, c0) are
higher than the utilities corresponding to (a1, b1, c1) - a desirable profile for player 3.
The uncertainty of a result of the game follows from the peculiar strategic position of
player 3. She could try to affect the decision of others by announcing before the game
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starts, that she is going to take an action c1. If the statement of player 3 is credible
enough then the history (a1, b1) might occur.
The MW approach. Let us examine the Selten’s Horse game via the protocol (10). It
turns out that among quantum realizations of the game Γ1 there exist ones that provide
the players with a unique reasonable solution. One of these realizations is constructed,
according to the idea of the MW scheme, as follows:
ΓMW1 =
(
Hc, {1, 2, 3}, |ψin(γ)〉, id{1,2,3}, {{σ0, σ1}i}, {Ei}
)
, (16)
where:
• Hc is a Hilbert space
⊗3
j=1C
2 with the computational basis {|x1〉|x2〉|x3〉}, where
xj ∈ {0, 1} for j = 1, 2, 3;
• the initial state |ψin(γ)〉 takes the form:
|ψin(γ)〉 = cos γ
2
|000〉+ i sin γ
2
|111〉 and γ ∈ (0, pi); (17)
• id{1,2,3} is an identity mapping defined on {1, 2, 3};
• the payoff functionals Ei are defined as follows:
E1,2 = 3
∑
x2
|〈0, x2, 0|ψfin〉|2 + 2
∑
x3
|〈11, x3|ψfin〉|2 + 5|〈100|ψfin〉|2;
E3 =
∑
x2
|〈0, x2, 0|ψfin〉|2 + 2
∑
x3
|〈11, x3|ψfin〉|2 + |〈101|ψfin〉|2.
(18)
Let us first determine the utilities Ei associated with any profile σκ1 ⊗ σκ2 ⊗ σκ3 ,
where κj ∈ {0, 1} for j = 1, 2, 3. The final state |ψfin〉 after the operation σκ1 ⊗σκ2 ⊗σκ3
takes the form:
(σκ1 ⊗ σκ2 ⊗ σκ3)|ψin〉 = cos
γ
2
|κ1, κ2, κ3〉+ i sin γ
2
|κ1, κ2, κ3〉, (19)
where κj in the negation of κj. Using the last equation and formula (12) the expected
utilities, for example, for (σ1 ⊗ σ0 ⊗ σ1) become:
E1,2(σ1 ⊗ σ0 ⊗ σ1) = 3 sin2 γ
2
, E3(σ1 ⊗ σ0 ⊗ σ1) = 1. (20)
All possible values Ei are shown in Fig. 2. Now, we can analyze the game Γ
MW
1 like
a classical 2×2×2 strategic game. To be fully precise, such equivalence is assured since
we can extend ΓMW1 to use mixed strategies. A profile of mixed strategies in the game in
Fig. 2 determines a probability distribution {pκ1,κ2,κ3} over profiles (σκ1 , σκ2 , σκ3). Thus,
the mixed strategy outcome in (16) is described simply as an ensemble {pκ1,κ2,κ3, (σκ1 ⊗
σκ2 ⊗σκ3)|ψin〉}. Then both the ensemble and an appropriate profile of mixed strategies
in the game in Fig. 2 generate the same utility outcome.
Let us notice now that ΓMW1 is a generalization of the normal representation of Γ1.
We are able to get the normal representation of Γ1 out of Fig. 2 putting the initial state
|ψin(0)〉, i.e., by putting γ = 0 into the matrix representation of the game in Fig. 2.
Moreover, the same is the case for |ψin(pi)〉 as well as any initial state being a basis
vector of Hc. Then the game Γ
MW
1 coincides with the classical Selten’s Horse game up
to the order of players’ strategies.
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Figure 2: A game in strategic form induced by the MW approach to the normal repre-
sentation of Γ1.
Now, we examine the six-tuple (16) to find a reasonable solution for players. Let us
determine pure Nash equilibria in the game ΓMW1 by solving for each profile (σκ1 , σκ2, σκ3),
where κj ∈ {0, 1} the system of inequalities imposed by the condition (2). Using values
of Ei(σκ1 , σκ2 , σκ3) placed in Fig. 2, we find that, for example, the profile (σ0, σ0, σ0)
constitutes the Nash equilibrium if and only if 2cos2(γ/2) ≤ 1. Further investigation
shows that the profile (σ1, σ1, σ1) also fulfills (2) with the requirement 2sin
2(γ/2) ≤ 1
and that there are no other pure Nash equilibria. Taking into consideration γ ∈ (0, pi)
we conclude that
NEpure(γ) =
{
(σ1, σ1, σ1), if 0 < γ ≤ pi/2;
(σ0, σ0, σ0), if pi/2 ≤ γ < pi. (21)
Let us assume results of the games Γ1 and Γ
MW
1 to be an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Then formula (21) shows that each player can gain from playing game ΓMW1 . In classical
case players 1 and 2 can assure themselves 2 utility units and player 3 can get 1 unit
for sure by playing pure equilibria. All these payoffs are strictly less than the payoffs
corresponding to pure Nash equilibria in ΓMW1 , irrespectively of what is a value of γ.
Moreover, notice that there is the unique equilibrium in the game ΓMW1 if γ 6= pi/2 and
the same utilities are assigned to both equilibria in the case γ = pi/2. This implies that
in the game ΓMW1 the strategy profile (σ0, σ0, σ0) for γ ∈ (pi/2, pi) and the strategy profile
(σ1, σ1, σ1) for γ ∈ (0, pi/2) are reasonable profiles for all players.
An interesting fact worth pointing out is that for γ arbitrary close to 0 or pi (i.e. for
angles defining the classical game) the equilibrium is unique. This discontinuity implies
possible applications of quantum games to classical game theory. Namely, the MW ap-
proach may serve as a Nash equilibrium refinement by considering only Nash equilibria
that hold out some slight perturbation of |ψin(0)〉. In fact, the profile (σ1, σ1, σ1) is the
unique pure trembling hand perfect equilibrium in Γ1 [16] (see also [10], example 252.1).
Although a further investigation is required, we believe there is a strong connection
between the above method and the Selten’s concept of trembling hand equilibrium.
The EWL approach. The second quantum realization of Γ1 is in the spirit of the EWL
protocol. Contrary to the previous one, where the number of reasonable Nash equilibria
was reduced to the unique one, we focus this time on improving strategic position of
9
only one of the players. Namely, let us modify the previous quantum game as follows:
ΓEWL1 =
(
He, {1, 2, 3}, |ψin〉, id{1,2,3}, {U1,2(θ, 0), U3(θ, α)}, {Ei}
)
, (22)
where:
• He is a Hilbert space
⊗3
j=1C
2 with the basis {|ψx1,x2,x3〉}xj∈{0,1} of entangled states
defined as follows:
|ψx1,x2,x3〉 =
|x1, x2, x3〉+ i|x1, x2, x3〉√
2
; (23)
• |ψin〉 := |ψ000〉;
• the unitary strategies are elements of {U(θ, α) : θ ∈ [0, pi], α ∈ [0, pi/2]} whose
matrix representation with respect to the computational input and output basis
is the following:
U(θ, α) =
(
eiα cos(θ/2) i sin(θ/2)
i sin(θ/2) e−iα cos(θ/2)
)
; (24)
• the payoff functional Ei is derived from ΓMW1 with respect to basis states (23):
E1,2 = 3
∑
x2
|〈ψ0,x2,0|ψfin〉|2 + 2
∑
x3
|〈ψ11,x3|ψfin〉|2 + 5|〈ψ100|ψfin〉|2;
E3 =
∑
x2
|〈ψ0,x2,0|ψfin〉|2 + 2
∑
x3
|〈ψ11,x3 |ψfin〉|2 + |〈ψ101|ψfin〉|2.
(25)
In this case only the third player is allowed to use unitary strategies beyond the set of
one-parameter operators of the game ΓEWL1 by using the additional parameter α. We
demonstrate now that such extended strategy set of player 3 significantly improves her
strategic position. In order to see this, let us determine the expected utility Ei for each
player i that corresponds to a profile of strategies τ = (θ1, θ2, (θ3, α3)) (since angles
specify strategies of player 1, 2, and 3, we denote them, for convenience, as θ1, θ2 and
(θ3, α3), respectively). Using formula (11) the final state |ψfin〉 associated with a profile
τ is the following:
|ψfin〉 = U(θ1, 0)⊗ U(θ2, 0)⊗ U(θ3, α3)|ψin〉 = 1√
2
∑
x∈{0,1}3
λx|x〉, (26)
where
λx1,x2,x3 = i
∑
xjeix3α3
∏
j
cos
(
xjpi − θj
2
)
+ (−i)
∑
xje−ix3α3
∏
j
cos
(
xjpi − θj
2
)
. (27)
Putting (26) into formulae (25) we obtain the utility outcomes:
E1,2(τ) = 2
(
sin2
θ1
2
sin2
θ2
2
sin2
θ3
2
+ cos2
θ1
2
cos2
θ2
2
cos2
θ3
2
sin2 α3
)
+ cos2
θ3
2
cos2 α3
[
3 cos2
θ1
2
+ sin2
θ1
2
(
2 + 3 cos2
θ2
2
)]
;
E3(τ) = cos
2 θ3
2
cos2 α3
(
2 sin2
θ1
2
sin2
θ2
2
+ cos2
θ1
2
)
+ cos2
θ1
2
cos2
θ3
2
sin2 α3
(
1 + cos2
θ2
2
)
+ sin2
θ1
2
sin2
θ3
2
(
1 + sin2
θ2
2
)
.
(28)
10
As it should be expected in the EWL protocol, we get the classical game Γ1 when the
player 3 is also restricted to use only the strategies (θ3, 0). Namely, let us put α = 0,
p := cos2(θ1/2), q := cos
2(θ2/2) and r := cos
2(θ3/2) to Eq. (28). Then we obtain
E1,2(θ1, θ2, (θ3, 0)) = 3pr + 5(1− p)qr + 2(1− p)(1− q);
E3(θ1, θ2, (θ3, 0)) = pr + (1− p)q(1− r) + 2(1− p)(1− q). (29)
Formulae (29) are exactly the players expected payoffs in the classical game Γ1 if they
choose their actions a0, b0 and c0 with probability p, q, and r, respectively. Thus, in
the particular case, if p, q, r ∈ {0, 1}, we obtain payoffs corresponding to pure strategy
profiles in Γ1.
Now we solve a problem how player 3 can gain from using 2-parameter operators
as her strategies. An interesting feature is that the game ΓEWL1 keeps the pure Nash
equilibria of the game Γ1, i.e., the profiles: (0, pi, (0, 0)) and (pi, pi, (pi, 0)) - equivalents
for the respective Nash equilibria profiles (a0, b1, c0) and (a1, b1, c1) in Γ1 - are Nash
equilibria profiles also in ΓEWL1 . However, unlike in the game Γ1, there is another pure
equilibrium τ ∗ = (0, 0, (0, pi/2)) where Ei(τ
∗) = 2 for each player i. This non-equivalence
to the classical profile is essential for strategic position of player 3. She can force the
other players to play strategies from the profile τ ∗ (instead of (0, pi, (0, 0)) - their the
most preferred equilibrium) by making an announcement that she is going to play τ ∗3 =
(0, pi/2). The other players know that this threat is credible enough as the player 3
does not suffer a loss when she deviates from (0, 0) to (0, pi/2), since E3(0, pi, (0, 0)) =
E3(0, pi, (0, pi/2)) = 1. However, the opponents of the third player lose 3 utilities, since
E1,2(0, pi, 0, pi/2) = 0. Furthermore, given (θ3, α3) = (0, pi/2) fixed, rationality demands
that they play strategies dictated by τ ∗ as we have argmaxθ1,θ2 E1,2(θ1, θ2, (0, pi/2)) =
{(0, 0)}. This argumentation allows to treat the profile τ ∗ as reasonable solution of
ΓEWL1 . Thus, the strategic position of the player 3 has been significantly improved in
comparison to her classical strategies.
The second example is aimed at showing that the proposed scheme of playing exten-
sive games based on the six-tuple (10) can be applied to extensive games in which some
of players have more than one information set. Unlike in Example 4.2 we now focus only
on converting an extensive game into the form described by (10) without considering a
specific strategic situation.
Example 4.3 Let the following extensive game be given:
Γ2 = ({1, 2}, H, P, {Ii}, u) , (30)
where
• H = {∅, a0, a1, (a0, b0), (a0, b1), (a1, c0), (a1, c1)};
• P (∅) = 1, P (a0) = P (a1) = 2;
• I1 = {{∅}}, I2 = {{a0}, {a1}}; u(aι1 , bι2) = Oι1,ι2, ι1, ι2 = 1, 2.
Like in the previous example, the game Γ2 has three information sets in which two ac-
tions are available. However, in this case, two information sets represent the knowledge
of player 2. Thus, she specifies an action at each of them. The game is illustrated in
Fig. 3. Since there will not be a need to use individual payoffs for players, we assign an
outcome Oι1,ι2 to each of terminal histories in H for convenience.
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Figure 3: The game Γ2: an extensive form a) and a normal form b).
The EWL approach. Let us first put the game (30) into the form described by the
six-tuple (10) via the EWL approach. Using the same line of reasoning as in the proof
of Proposition 4.1, the number of qubit on which a player is allowed to operate has to
agree with the number of her information sets. To define the outcome functional E for
the quantum game we associate particular outcomes Oι1,ι2 with appropriate basis states
of {|ψx1,x2,x3〉}. For example, we identify the outcome O10 of the game Γ2 with the basis
states {|ψ1,x2,0〉}x2=0,1 measured on |ψfin〉, and the outcome O00 with the basis states
{|ψ00,x3〉}x3=0,1. Formally, the EWL approach to (30) is a six-tuple
ΓEWL2 = (He, {1, 2}, |ψin(pi/2)〉, ξ, {Ui}, E) (31)
defined by the following components:
• the map ξ on {1, 2, 3} given by the formula: ξ(j) =
{
1, if j = 1;
2, if j ∈ {2, 3}. ;
• the set Ui of unitary operators such that {U(θ, 0)} ⊆ Ui ⊆ SU(2) for i = 1, 2;
• E is the outcome functional of the form:
E =
∑
ι2,x3=0,1
O0,ι2|〈ψ0,ι2,x3|ψfin〉|2 +
∑
ι2,x2=0,1
O1,ι2|〈ψ1,x2,ι2|ψfin〉|2. (32)
Let us prove that (31) generalizes (30). Following the definition of ΓEWL2 , the strategy
set of player 1 is simply U1, and player 2 chooses her strategies from the set U2 ⊗ U2
since she operates on the second and the third qubit. Therefore, the final state |ψfin〉
in the game ΓEWL2 takes the form of
⊗3
j=1Uj |ψin〉, where Uj ∈ Uξ(j). Let us assume
that the players apply unitary operators form the set {U(θ, 0)}. Then the final state is
represented by Eq. (26) and Eq. (27) for α3 = 0. It implies that the expected outcome
E(θ1, (θ2, θ3)) equals
E(θ1, (θ2, θ3)) =
(
O00 cos
2 θ2
2
+O01 sin
2 θ2
2
)
cos2
θ1
2
+
(
O10 cos
2 θ3
2
+O11 sin
2 θ3
2
)
sin2
θ1
2
. (33)
By substitution p := cos2 θ1/2, q := cos
2 θ1/2, and r := cos
2 θ1/2, Eq. (33) shows the
expected outcome in game Γ2 when player 1 chooses a0 with probability p and player 2
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chooses b0 and c0 with probability q and r, respectively. To sum up, the six-tuple (31) in-
deed allows to describe the quantum extension of the game Γ2 within the EWL approach.
The MW approach. In a similar way, we rewrite the game Γ2 using the MW approach
by replacing the components He, {|ψx1,x2,x3〉}, and {Ui} with Hc, {|x1, x2, x3〉}, and
{{U(0, 0), U(pi, 0)}i}, respectively. Then similar analysis to that in Example 4.2 shows
that the game given by ΓMW2 coincides with Γ2 if |ψfin〉 = |ψfin(0)〉.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the six-tuple (H, N, ρin, ξ, {Uj}, {Ei}) allows to study extensive
games using quantum information language. Although proposed scheme is suitable only
for a normal representation in which some features of corresponding classical game in
extensive form are lost, it yields on valuable information about how passing to quan-
tum domain influences a course of extensive games. The examples we studied have
shown that an extensive game played with the use of both the MW approach and the
EWL approach substantially differs from this game played classically. Furthermore, the
quantum schemes may yield to the players’ significant advantages in the form of better
strategic positions and pointing out reasonable solutions, as it often happens in the area
of strategic games.
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